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This paper studies the time-inconsistency issue in a setting where
the present government pre-announces a tax rate on labor income, and
output is a resource exploited by the government and privates’ jointly.
The present government is tempted to increase its consumption
by implementing a tax rate higher than what it had announced and
privates had agreed upon. When confronted with this temptation,
it must take account of a threat of privates enacting trigger strate-
gies that will eventually confine present and next governments to low
consumption levels. The comparison between benefits and costs from
defection also depends on the extent the present government discounts
next governments welfare. In particular, the trade-off between contin-
uation and defection is as follows: defection entails an immediate and
temporary increase in the utility enjoyed by the present government.
As a consequence of privates enacting trigger strategies, a utility loss is
suffered directly by the present government until the next government
starts, and indirectly as a consequence of every successive government
being confined to low levels of consumption.
By ensuring the value of continuation exceeds the value of defec-
tion, a sufficiently low level of public debt acts as a commitment device
for continuation of the pre-announced tax policy even when the util-
ity loss suffered from the enactment of trigger strategies across the
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present government time horizon does not outweigh the benefits that
the present government directly enjoys from defection.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the time-inconsistency problem for a government that
pre-announces a tax rate on labor income.
The analysis is cast inside a setting where all income is from labor and
taxation makes it a resource exploited by the government and the privates’
jointly. It thus departs from the standard infinitely-lived representative agent
framework in which public debt is a device to smooth out the excess burden
across time, and in the case of a favorable net debt position the govern-
ment would optimally set steady state tax rates on raw labor (i.e. its flow
component) income to zero (see, on this point, [8]). Unlike the benevolent
government setting, it is here assumed that governments are interested in the
maximization of their own utility they derive from consumption.
Incentives for the present government to be time consistent arise out of
the possibility for privates to enact trigger strategies (and the delay occur-
ring from deviation and enactment of trigger strategies) and depend on the
extent that the present government discounts future governments welfare.
More exactly, the present government faces a trade-off between continuation
and defection. If it defects, its utility increases until privates enact trig-
ger strategies. This utility gain has to be weighted against the utility loss
that trigger strategies determine until the government ends, plus the welfare
reduction suffered by every successive government.
By ensuring the value of continuation exceeds the value of defection, a
sufficiently low level of public debt acts as a commitment device for contin-
uation of the pre-announced tax policy even when the utility loss suffered
from the enactment of trigger strategies across the present government time
horizon does not outweigh the benefits that the present government directly
enjoys from defection.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 puts forth the model ac-
cording to the joint exploitation framework of [6] and [7]. Section 3 studies
the game between the present government and the public. Section 4 adds
the intertemporal game between successive governments. Section 5 ends the
paper with a summary of the results.
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2 The model
The government imposes taxes on labor and uses fiscal revenue to finance its
consumption and service debt. Private agents are willing to pay labor income
taxes according to the pre-announced tax rate ω. In case they perceive the
government levies more than the rate it committed to, they will subsequently
enact a trigger strategy.
Let the government’s instantaneous utility be given by the concave and
continuous at 0 utility function u. Newly produced output can either be
consumed or saved. The saved portion becomes productive capital via a
transformation m, and depends on households’ choices over consumption, c,
and leisure, l, as well as government’s choices over G and ω, i.e. government
consumption and the tax rate on labor income. Thus we may write
·
k = m (k, l, c, G, ω)
As regards to m, we make the following assumptions (see [19] for the case in
which productive capital can be consumed):
(A1) m : R5→R is concave, with m (0, ·, ·, ·, ·) = 0;
(A2) |m (x1, ·, ·, ·, ·)−m (x2, ·, ·, ·, ·)| ≤M |x1 − x2| for all x1, x2 ∈ R+.
For simplicity, we assume that both households and the government have
agreed upon a consumption path (c,G) which is consistent with market equi-




> 0, i.e. an increase in labor-
income tax reduces private consumption and increases leisure. In accordance
with [7] framework, it is assumed that the net effect of a higher labor income
tax rate on households’ utility is negative.
It is assumed the pre-announced path where taxes on labor income are ω
and G is consistent with the public sector budget constraint, e.g. G+ ρB =
ωL, where B is the given level of public debt. The analysis is restricted to
steady state with net interest rate equal to the time preference rate ρ, as
taxes on capital income are inefficient (see, among many others, [1].) The
next Section characterizes the set of equilibria in this dynamic game and,
hence, the optimal strategies for the players.
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3 A game between the present government
and the private agents
The incentives for the present government to stick to the pre-announced
tax rate ω can be investigated with reference to the recursive structure of
its decision process. At every instant of time, the government evaluates
whether it is best for it to continue complying with the pre-announced policy
or not. It will not defect if the value of continuation of the pre-announced
strategy is higher than the value of defection, i.e. if Vc > Vd. The value of
defection depends on the possibility of households playing trigger strategies
as a consequence of the government defecting. If households were unable
to enact trigger strategies, the government would find it optimal defecting
the pre-announced tax rate by playing a constant upper level G¯ > G. Of
course, the government may accomplish this by levying a tax rate greater
than ω. The assumption of an upper bound on government’s consumption is
consistent with [6]. In what follows, G¯ < Y.
If, instead, households can play trigger strategies, the government must
take account of their reaction when evaluating the benefits from defection.
If it plays G¯, by use of ω¯ > ω at any instant, the households will play ωd < ω
from sometime in the future onwards. The value of defection depends on(
G¯−G) positively, and on (ω − ωd) negatively. Furthermore, we assume
that households perceive the government’s defection with a delay τ.
The important difference w.r.t. the literature on the joint-exploitation
of a productive asset is that newly produced output is an asset that is not
exhausted under fast consumption, rather it keeps constant. This implies a
difference in the calculation of the value function under defection. Namely,
the value function will be calculated under constant capital (since there is no
investment) and constant B, since households will be paying taxes only to
the extent of servicing public debt from the instant the defection is perceived
onwards. Hence, the government will be enjoying only a constant lower
(possibly zero) level Gd < G¯.

























where T is the government’s horizon.
Following [6], we assume linear utility and get















1− e−ρτ] [G¯−G]+ 1
ρ
(
e−ρte−ρτ − e−ρT ) [Gd −G] (1)
It is clear that for all τ > 0, the first term is an incentive to defect. It
measures the benefits the government enjoys from both the existence of the
informational lag and the fact that households will not be able to implement
trigger strategies any sooner than t + τ . As given an agreed upon tax rate,
higher debt implies lower G, this incentive is greater the larger B, and the
greater τ.When governments have a short horizon, this incentive is dominant.
The second-term is a disincentive to defect and measures the government’s
welfare loss caused by the enactment of the trigger strategy on the part of
households.
A low level of public debt acts as a commitment device in the sense that
with both a high level of B and a low labor-income tax rate ω, the government
is tempted to defect from the policy it had previously announced. This
temptation is stronger the longer the informational lag τ and the shorter the
government’s horizon T.
4 An intertemporal differential game between
governments and privates
In this Section we investigate how the incentives for defection/continuation
of the pre-announced fiscal policy change when the present government is
not only involved in a game with the private sector, but also takes into ac-
count the effects of its actions on the welfare of next governments when their
choices over tax rates (and deficit/surplus) are not constrained by previous
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government’s choices. We now assume that G + ρB < ωL so that, under
continuation
·
B < 0 =⇒ BT ≤ Bt.
The problem can be formalized as a differential game where the objective
for the present government is
Jˆ (Bt, t) = max
∫ T
t
e−ρsu (Gs) ds+ VT (G (BT ))
s.t.
·
B = ρB − ωL+G
where
VT (G (BT )) =
∫ ∞
T
e−ρsu (Gs (Bs)) ds
is the utility that accrues to the present government from the bequest of BT
to the next government.




























e−ρsu (G) ds+ VT (G (BcT ))
with BdT and B
c
T denoting public debt under defection and continuation,
respectively. As seen before, the shorter T the greater the incentive to defect
for the present government. On the other side, the differential game between
governments introduces an additional incentive for the present government to
stick to the announced policy. The reason is simple: if the present government
does not defect, i.e. Gt + ρBt < ωL, t ≤ T , then B decreases and Gτ ≥ Gt
τ > T becomes feasible for next government (without any need for it to
defect.) Hence, next government will not enjoy a lower utility.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that, given the stationarity of prefer-
ences, if the present government does not defect, every successive government
will be faced with fading incentives for defection.
In other words, the utility that accrues along the time horizon of the
present government is determined by the game between the government and
the private agents. The subsequent utility VT (G (BT )) is determined by the
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game between governments. Even though the present government cannot
commit the next government not to reschedule the optimal path in view of the
new current state BT , it is clear how, given both stationarity of preferences
and existence of trigger strategies, every next government will be acting just
as the present government does. Hence, in the present setting, the time
inconsistency problem is an issue only to the present government.
A low level of public debt acts as a commitment device that ensures the
continuation of the pre-announced policy even when the utility loss suffered
from the enactment of trigger strategies does not outweigh the benefits that
the present government directly enjoys from defection.
If we assume the government has an horizon that does not extend beyond
the glimpse of a time instant, then the game between the present govern-
ment and the privates does not matter. In this case, only the differential
game between governments is of importance, and the analysis becomes a
straightforward application of the results by [16]. The reason for this is that
the present government does not fear any trigger strategy, since any such
strategy will necessarily take place after its time horizon has elapsed, and
thus will target next governments.
When the time horizon is not too short, new incentives emerge as the
game between governments and privates becomes relevant too. In particular,
the threat of trigger strategies heavily influences the present government’s
choice between defection and continuation. To the extent that this threat is
sufficient to drive the present government’s choice to continuation, it plays
the role of a substitute for an anchor to an ethic of sound finance.
Summing up, governments may be led to act in accordance with a pre-
announced tax policy because of the threat imposed by the private sector
enacting trigger strategies that confine the government (either at present or
in the future) to a low consumption equilibrium. This threat operates both
through the game between present government and the private sector (to the
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5 Conclusions
This paper studied the time-inconsistency issue in a setting where the present
government pre-announces a tax rate on labor income, and output is a re-
source jointly exploited by the government and the privates’.
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The present government faces incentives to behave in a time consistent
manner that consist of the threat put by the possibility for privates to enact
trigger strategies (and the delay occurring from deviation and enactment of
trigger strategies), and depend on the extent to which it discounts future
governments welfare. More exactly, the present government faces a trade-
off between continuation and defection as follows: if it defects, its utility
increases until privates enact trigger strategies. This utility gain has to be
weighted off against the utility loss that trigger strategies determine until
the government ends, plus the welfare reduction suffered by every successive
government.
In particular, governments may be led to act in accordance with a pre-
announced tax rate because of the threat imposed by the private sector en-
acting trigger strategies that confine the government (either at present or in
the future) to a low consumption equilibrium.
By ensuring the value of continuation exceeds the value of defection, a
sufficiently low level of public debt acts as a commitment device for contin-
uation of the pre-announced tax policy even when the utility loss suffered
from the enactment of trigger strategies across the present government time
horizon does not outweigh the benefits that the present government directly
enjoys from defection.
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